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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation.

2:30 p.m.

DATE: September 21, 1961

SUBJECT: Germany and Berlin, Disarmament,
Red China

PLACE: Secretary's suite
Waldorf Towers
New York City

US
PARTICIPANTS The Secretary
EUR - Mr. Kohler
S/B - Mr. Bohlen
D/P - Mr. Akalovsky
(Interpreting)

USSR
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Semenov
Mr. Kovalev
Mr. Sukhodrev
(Interpreter)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

MR Date June 26, 1991

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Following the luncheon the Secretary opened the discussion, saying that he was glad that Mr. Gromyko had been able to lunch with him and to have a talk about "Germany and Berlin". He said he should make it clear that although he knew the points of the other Governments concerned on our side, he was not speaking with a mandate from them. These were bilateral conversations. He would start by referring back to the conversations between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev at Vienna. He would recall that President Kennedy was very disturbed by what Mr. Khrushchev had said with respect to the Soviet position on Germany and Berlin. Much had also been said on the subject since that time. Therefore the Secretary thought it would be well if he explained as simply as he could what we considered to be the heart of the matter. He would therefore speak about the present situation as it appeared to us and Mr. Gromyko could then tell us whether this was a correct presentation from their point of view.

The Soviet Government, the Secretary said, states that it is putting forward certain proposals with respect to Germany, but that if these are not accepted by the West then

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the Soviet Union will conclude a peace treaty with the East Germans. Up to this point we are presented with no overwhelming problem because, even though we may dislike it and not agree, we cannot prevent the signature of such a document. As we see it the crisis occurs because the Soviet Government states that this act will terminate allied rights and that access to West Berlin will then be subject to the agreement and consent of the East German regime. At this point the Soviets would be moving against what President Kennedy has described as three vital interests of the United States. Not only are these vital interests but they represent fundamental commitments of the United States and its NATO allies. Thus we are in a situation when the United States is not moving in any way against the USSR but the Soviet Government is taking the initiative against the vital interests of the United States and its allies. This is the situation that is dangerous. He was not threatening but he would say that we consider ourselves to be under a threat. We do not want an arms race but we will not draw away from it in these circumstances. We do not want a conflict but we will have to prepare and be ready to face one if it is forced upon us.

The Secretary continued that both sides must know clearly what are the vital interests of the other so that there can be no mistake. If the Soviet Government has concerns which have not been made known to us officially, he was prepared to hear them.

We believe, the Secretary said, and we believe you believe that our two countries share a common interest in preventing war. We also believe and believe you believe that each side has vital interests which are not the same but perhaps parallel, but that we still have a common interest in finding ways to live at peace in the world. The Soviet proposals did not seem to us to be put forward in a spirit of discussion and negotiation but rather as a sort of unilateral edict. The Secretary quoted the Soviet formula that the urgent and important question was "the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and the solution on this basis of the problem of West Berlin." Such a formula left little or no room for discussion or negotiation as these terms are commonly understood.

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From time to time, the Secretary went on, there were some remarks from the Soviet side which if taken out of context seemed to us reasonable. Consequently we had felt that quiet talks might clarify to each other what we consider our vital interests. We would see whether the crisis has to proceed to a grim conclusion or whether there is some way to bring it to an end.

Mr. Gromyko replied by saying that the Soviet Government had expressed its readiness to have this exchange of views between the Secretary and himself in order to discuss the question of a peace treaty with Germany and of settling the problem of West Berlin on the basis of such a treaty. He continued that the success of this exchange of views should be measured by the extent to which the two governments will succeed in drawing a line under World War II by signing a peace treaty with Germany. The Soviet Government believed that there is no problem today that is more urgent and pressing than the question of a peace treaty with Germany and of settling the question of West Berlin on the basis of such a treaty. The fact that the situation has become even more heated recently -- and this was not caused by the Soviet Union but rather by the Western Powers -- confirms the necessity of reaching agreement on or at least having some kind of success in this matter as a result of this exchange of views. Referring to the Secretary's remark that he wanted to obtain a fuller clarification of the Soviet position and of the Soviet Union's objectives in this matter of a peace treaty, Mr. Gromyko stated that he would try to set forth the position of the Soviet Government although that position had been outlined in great detail by Mr. Khrushchev in Vienna. He said that he recognized the possibility of the US Government's not having a completely clear picture of the Soviet position and objectives. Therefore he wished to indicate why the Soviet Union had raised this question and why it believed a peace treaty was so urgent and brooked no delay. As the Secretary knew, sixteen years had passed since World War II. Likewise the Secretary knew that the period of occupation after a war was always terminated by

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a peace treaty if no peace treaty was signed immediately after the cessation of hostilities. In spite of the fact that sixteen years have passed there is still no peace treaty with Germany. The reason why the Soviet Union believed it to be necessary to have a peace treaty signed is that it is convinced that such a treaty would place obstacles in the way of the development of revanchism and militarism in West Germany. West German leaders have been raising the question of a revision of borders in Europe and the Soviet Union believes that a peace treaty would codify juridically the borders which have been shaped as a result of World War II. A peace treaty would also change radically the abnormal relations between West Germany and the GDR. As is well known, now the relations between West Germany and the GDR are far from normal and this is due to the aggressive policy of West Germany toward the GDR. West Germany does not conceal its intention to swallow the GDR; however, it should know that this is an adventurous policy. Likewise a peace treaty would eliminate the cause of aggravation in the relations between the US and the USSR and indeed among all big powers. Such a treaty would also eliminate the cause of the rise in temperature in Germany and Europe, which are in a feverish state like a sick man. The Soviet Government believes that the wisdom of policy should be measured not by the degree to which the militarists and revanchists of other countries succeed in setting our two countries of loggerheads but rather by the degree to which we succeed in staying away from the brink of war, a war which would be a thermo-nuclear one, and by the success in averting such war. Such should be the yardstick in appraising the policy of the great powers and particularly of the United States and the USSR in view of their significance in Europe and elsewhere. A peace treaty must be based on the actual situation now prevailing in Germany and Europe, i.e., on the fact that there are two German states in existence, the GDR and the FRG. Therefore the Soviet Union proposes that a peace treaty be signed with both states. There could be one treaty with two states or two separate treaties one with each of the two states. The fact that some officials

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in the West dislike the situation in the GDR or the leaders of that state should not be an obstacle. After all some states do not like the situation prevailing in West Germany. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it dislikes the present situation in West Germany because it resembles very much the situation prevailing in Hitler's Germany. There have been statements to the effect that a peace treaty with the two German states would make unification of the two Germanies or rapprochement between them more difficult. This argument holds no water because the Soviet Union believes that if unification is possible at all it can be achieved not by heating the situation existing between the two German states but rather by a peace treaty under which both German states would undertake to refrain from the use of arms and to settle their problems by peaceful means. A rapprochement between the two German states would be brought about by a detente in Germany and throughout Europe. Mr. Gromyko repeated that only a peace treaty would increase the chances of German unification, if there are such chances at all. Thus this argument proves just the opposite of what it is intended to prove. If one of the two German states, namely the FRG, sharpens its knife with the intention of plunging it into the GDR's back, the latter will not remain passive and will call its allies for help. This would of course not promote any rapprochement and would only deepen the rift. On the other hand a peace treaty signed by all states which participated in the war against Germany would further the cause of rapprochement between the two German states. These two states are not entirely different; the difference between them is as deep as possible because the two states have different social systems. Therefore they cannot be brought closer together on any basis except the basis of foreign policy. Of course there is another possibility -- that of a military solution -- but the United States and the Soviet Union are great powers and both of them know what that would mean. Mr. Gromyko reiterated that if there is a possibility of rapprochement between the two German states it exists only on the basis of foreign policy. Mr. Gromyko

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recalled that Mr. Khrushchev had explained this aspect of the problem in Vienna. Mr. Khrushchev had also mentioned the cheap demagogic in West Germany with regard to self-determination. However West Germany leaves only a small detail out of sight namely that one of the two German states is a militarist state whereas the other is a socialist state and peace-loving by definition. Mr. Gromyko went on to say that the problem of West Berlin could also be solved by a peace treaty. There is an occupation regime in West Berlin today, which is the result of World War II and which is based on the various temporary agreements concluded among the allies after the war. However that occupation regime cannot exist indefinitely; it has outlived itself. Mr. Gromyko stated that he had been instructed by the Soviet Government that a peace treaty would terminate the occupation regime and would proclaim West Berlin a free city. As to the question of a free city of West Berlin, Mr. Gromyko said, there appeared to be certain problems and aspects which were of interest to the United States. He said he did not know what words to use so as to sound as convincing as possible. Mr. Khrushchev had stated quite convincingly that the idea of a free, demilitarized city of West Berlin did not signify the desire on the part of the Soviet Union or the GDR to gain hold over that city. The Soviet Union does not need West Berlin. It does not need its resources, its population, or its housing. The GDR -- and the Soviet Union knows its position -- is of the same opinion and is prepared to pledge to respect what the West calls the freedom of that city, i.e., the independence of West Berlin. Mr. Gromyko said that he wanted to stress this point as vigorously as he could and noted that if there was any doubt on the part of the United States it should be removed now. He emphasized that the Soviet Union was prepared to accept the strictest international guarantees and recalled the fact that the Soviet Union had made various suggestions on this point. The Soviet Union would be prepared to have forces of the Four Powers -- the U.S., the USSR, the UK and France -- in West Berlin so as to ensure what the Secretary had called US presence in that city. Another possibility would be to have neutral forces stationed in West Berlin.

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or as a third possibility to have UN forces in that city. Mr. Gromyko said he wondered what other more effective guarantees were needed if the status of West Berlin as a free city were to be guaranteed with the participation of the US, the USSR and the other great powers, or if necessary by the UN. He said that no more effective guarantees existed either in theory or practice. All this should certainly dispel any doubts the US might have on this point. Turning to the question of access, Mr. Gromyko stated that access was linked to a number of temporary -- and he said he wanted to stress the word temporary -- agreements concluded as a result of the unconditional surrender of Germany. A peace treaty would change this situation in the sense that the solution of the problem of access would have to be on a different basis. The Soviet Government and Mr. Khrushchev himself have repeatedly stressed that the signing of a peace treaty would not signify severance of all communications between West Berlin and the outside world. Neither would it signify a blockade of West Berlin because a blockade would strangle the city and its economic life. The Soviet Union opposes anything like this. Soviet proposals provide for free access to West Berlin. The only rule that the United States and the other countries should observe is that in view of the fact that a peace treaty would have been signed and that all communication lines including air run through the territory of the GDR, access would have to be based on arrangements with the GDR. Mr. Gromyko then stated that he was aware of the fact that certain US officials, including the President and the Secretary himself, had raised the question of how one could be sure that there would be freedom of access if a peace treaty was signed with the GDR. The Soviet Union's reply to this is that not only can free access be ensured but it will be ensured on the basis of Soviet guarantees. The GDR has stated repeatedly that it would also respect such arrangements. But even assuming that the United States, or the President, or the Secretary personally

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does not trust the GDR, there is no reason for concern because both our countries would guarantee West Berlin's ties with the outside world. After all, don't our two countries rely on their own capabilities? If we cast doubt on our own capabilities or policies, then the state of affairs is gloomy indeed.

Mr. Gromyko recalled that President Kennedy had used the simile of a pipe which could be cut off in the middle, presumably by the GDR. The Soviet Union can state that that would be impossible and that such a possibility is completely out of the question. The Soviet Union knows its capabilities. Furthermore there should be reliance on international agreements because if there is no such reliance the situation is also gloomy indeed. Should we really refuse to sign any international agreements? Mr. Gromyko went on to say that the Soviet Government had weighed and discussed this problem of access and tried to understand why the United States Government regards this solution to be unacceptable. The Soviet Government has been unable to find any basis for such doubts on the part of the United States. In the view of the Soviet Union the question of access, which is frequently over dramatized by the West, is much simpler than it is represented. This problem would be resolved on the basis of a peace treaty. No vital interests are involved here, nor is the prestige of the United States or any other country in question. Of course all depends on the interpretation of what prestige means. There could be an incorrect, one-sided interpretation, but in any event the Soviet Union has no intention of injuring the prestige of the United States. Mr. Gromyko said he did not know whether the Secretary would agree with this but he thought that all nations, including the peoples of the US, the Soviet Union and other countries, would experience relief if this cause of tension was removed. Referring to the Secretary's remark that the US considered itself to be under threat, Mr. Gromyko stated that the Soviet Union did not intend to threaten anyone. The

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proposal to sign a peace treaty is no threat, whereas war is a threat. All the Soviet Union wants is to purify the atmosphere in Europe and throughout the world. Referring to the Secretary's statement that Soviet proposals implied that if they were not accepted a peace treaty with the GDR would be signed unilaterally and that therefore negotiations were not possible, Mr. Gromyko said this was apparently a misunderstanding. This was not correct. The Soviet Union has repeatedly stated that it is prepared to consider other proposals, by the US or by other states, relating to the conclusion of a peace treaty. Turning to the present situation and to the question of how the Soviet Union envisaged the further development of events, Mr. Gromyko stated that as before the Soviet Government wished to reach agreement with the United States and its allies, the UK, France and others, on the signing of a peace treaty with Germany and on the solution of the West Berlin problem on the basis of such treaty. Mr. Gromyko said that he wanted to emphasize that this was the Soviet Union's choice number one. Only as a last resort would the Soviet Union sign a peace treaty unilaterally -- to use the Secretary's term -- in other words do the same the United States did in Japan. If the United States action in Japan was legitimate whey then is there such nervousness about the Soviet Union's intention to sign a peace treaty with the GDR. There can be no two rules of legitimacy possible. However, Mr. Gromyko said he wanted to repeat that only in that case would the Soviet Union be compelled to sign a peace treaty with the GDR. After stating that this was his reply, Mr. Gromyko added that, as to the timing, Mr. Khrushchev had stated the Soviet position in his conversation with the President and that he personally had nothing new to say. The Soviet Union believed that a peace treaty should be concluded this year. It also believes that there is possibility for reaching agreement on this question. Mr. Gromyko concluded by expressing the hope that the present discussion would constitute a beginning in that direction.

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After Mr. Gromyko's opening statement, the Secretary said that in the interest of moving things forward he would add to his own statement. He said he was certain that Mr. Gromyko would understand that we are not completely convinced as regards the reliability of new agreements put forward at the very time when it is clear that existing agreements are to be disregarded. It was true in one sense that the agreements made during and after the war were considered temporary, because it was then assumed that they would come to an end as soon as it became possible to conclude a peace treaty with a single German Government. It was not assumed, however, that one side would unilaterally bring them to an end before that time.

As to the principle of self-determination he said we believe that this opens the way to a solution which would have some chance of being workable and viable over a period of years. When "solutions" are founded on an artificial basis then a situation of instability results. He realized that the Soviet Government would not agree with him, but he felt that this principle must be taken into account because of its bearing on the longer term stability of any arrangement.

Mr. Gromyko had mentioned the so-called rearmament and militarization of Western Germany. We could understand why the peoples of Eastern Europe after their terrible experiences of the last war would be concerned about the rearmament of a Germany with aggressive designs. The Secretary recalled however, that the Western allies had not permitted Western Germany to rearm until after the East Germans had been rearmed by the Soviets in the face of Western protests. We were well aware that at the present time there were in East Germany not only the East German military forces but at least 20 divisions of Soviet forces mobile and well equipped. He recognized that these

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latter might be in part for East Germany itself but these forces nevertheless were a part of the military problem confronting the West. The Federal Government's rearmament was not aggressive and the Federal military forces were integrated into NATO which also was not aggressive. There was great assurance of stability and security in the fact that the Federal Republic is thoroughly integrated into the broader Western European community. The Secretary said he would not try to review history on which he and Mr. Gromyko would not agree. However, if Mr. Gromyko would examine carefully he would realize that NATO was conceived, organized and exists as a purely defensive organization with no aggressive intentions. However, he said, we are willing to look at both sides and to see whether arrangements can be found which would relieve tensions and give to both the East and the West a greater feeling of security.

The Secretary said he also wished to comment as to why the Soviet proposals on West Berlin are not acceptable. The area of greater Berlin was agreed to as a separate enclave within - it is true - but separate from the Soviet zone of occupation. In all Soviet discussions of the Berlin problem and in the Soviet proposals East Berlin has simply disappeared from the scene. We have been told that the subject of East Berlin is not negotiable. Thus having disposed of East Berlin without regard to its four power responsibilities the Soviets were now turning to West Berlin which is our area of responsibility under these agreements. The Soviet proposals ignored the simplest approach. If the Soviet Government wished to have troops in Berlin it could have proposed their stationing in East Berlin. If the Soviet Government wished for example to suggest the locating of the UN in Berlin then it could have proposed that this location be the whole city of Berlin. Mr. Gromyko had asked what better guarantee West Berlin could have than the Soviet proposals. The Secretary said he knew at least one answer: the proposals of the United States, Britain and France as at present guaranteeing the integrity of West Berlin and the freedom of its population.

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The situation is the same, the Secretary continued, as respects the access question. There is no mystery about this. For many years access rights have been exercised by road, by rail, by canal and by air. There was no need for the Soviets to reopen this question. If the Soviet Government wants to make an agreement with the East German regime, then that is one thing. However, he wanted to say clearly that our access rights are not available to the Soviet Government to be turned over to the East German Government. The Soviet Government cannot turn over to someone else what it does not have itself, that is, the right to dispose of our access rights. The Secretary felt that some illusion had been created by the physical location of Berlin. He would ask Mr. Gromyko rather to look at the political aspects of the question. For political purposes, he said, West Berlin is not 110 miles inside East Germany, but right on the demarcation line between West and East Germany.

The Secretary took note of Mr. Gromyko's remarks with respect to relations between the Federal Republic and the East German regime. He said that we, too, believe that relations between the two in such fields as trade are valuable and could be extended. This would be a good field to explore.

The Secretary said this had been a useful exchange giving both sides something to think about. He was concerned from what he knew and had learned of the Soviet position that the two countries would be on a collision course. Therefore, we must review and think on both sides about how to avoid this. He agreed that it was important not to let the situation get out of hand and develop into a direct clash. There was no reason why this should be as between the Soviet Union and the United States, both of us had big things to do at home; moreover, the arms race should be stopped and the arms burden reduced.

The Secretary said that when President Kennedy was in Vienna he had received a strong impression that the underlying intent of the Soviet proposals was to drive the West out of Berlin and pave the way for the absorption of the city. What

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Mr. Gromyko had said today had not wholly removed the Secretary's anxiety on this score. We trusted that Mr. Gromyko would understand that these were most important concerns and that we would welcome further clarification on these matters from the Soviet side.

The Secretary concluded that it was important for the two governments to keep in touch on these questions. He wanted to make sure that Mr. Gromyko understood that the U.S. does not have in mind to seek prolonged talks and negotiations as a delaying tactic. Surely the Soviet Government understands that there were some limits to discussion during the German electoral campaign. At the same time, he himself had some understanding of Mr. Khrushchev's complaint to the effect that "somebody is always having elections." The Secretary considered it important that talks keep us in touch and that we not let events keep us in touch. It was for this reason that he had recently called in Soviet Charge Smirnovsky on the question of the Soviet references to our air access, since unilateral action in this respect could very seriously get in the way of peaceful discussion. On our part we were not surprised at the Soviet reaction when the West German fighter planes landed in Berlin. Speaking quietly here, he could assure Mr. Gromyko that the West German flyers were not spies but were really lost. However, we would on our part try to prevent further incidents.

Mr. Gromyko said that he wanted to make a few remarks about self-determination. He said that it was difficult for him to believe that the Secretary was serious in raising that question. While the Secretary had not spelled out his conception of self-determination, it appeared that his conception was Adenauer's conception. If this is so then it should be pointed out that the German people expressed their self-determination in 1949 when two states, different in nature and organized on the basis of different social systems, came into being. Adenauer's conception is divorced from life and, Mr. Gromyko said, it was difficult to believe that the Secretary should seriously contemplate such an idea. Referring to the Secretary's remarks on the question of militarism and

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revanchism, Mr. Gromyko said that he was not surprised by what the Secretary had said. After all, the United States is an ally of West Germany. However, Mr. Gromyko said, he was not impressed. The Soviet Union knows very well that Hitler's Germany unleashed a war which caused millions upon millions of victims and what is now happening to West Germany reminds very much of Hitler's days. This is not theory, it is fact. The United States states that it has vital interests, but the Soviet Union says that the situation in West Germany is of vital interest to it and to its allies. This is why the Secretary's remarks on this point, including his appraisal of NATO and German membership in it, are not convincing. The Secretary had referred to the formation of armed forces in East Germany. However, at one time the Soviet Union had proposed that a limit be set for armed forces in both West and East Germany and that such an arrangement be subject to control. The United States rejected that proposal. If troops in East Germany were of no concern to the United States at that time, then why are they now. Apparently at that time the United States weighed the possibility of demilitarization of all of Germany against the prospect of a rearmed West Germany, taking into account that something would of course be done in East Germany as well. The latter concept apparently prevailed; therefore why should the Soviet Union be blamed now? Furthermore the fact is that East German forces are no threat to the Western powers or anyone else. As to the Berlin question, Mr. Gromyko said, the situation would be different if West Berlin were located in the heart of West Germany. However the United States cannot escape the fact that West Berlin is inside East Germany. The Secretary had said that the Soviet Union should not over-emphasize the temptation caused by the geographic location of Berlin. This term is not applicable and is totally out of place. The fact is that East Berlin is part of the GDR. Its social order is the same as that in the GDR. On the other hand the social system in West Berlin is different and in fact the United States itself says that it wants to preserve that different system, or what it calls

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system, or what it calls freedom. Mr. Gromyko then said that he wanted to make a few remarks on the question of negotiations and exchange of views. He said that he liked the Secretary's concluding remarks to the effect that both sides must search for a way out, for a way to avoid collision between the US and the USSR and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact as a whole. The Soviet Union is all for it and this is why it agreed to have this exchange of views, which was proposed by the United States. It has agreed in order to find a mutually acceptable solution. However, as the Soviet Government has repeatedly stated, solution cannot be postponed indefinitely. Sixteen years have passed; how many years should we wait -- fifty years? Referring to the Secretary's remark about the German elections, Mr. Gromyko said of course the United States knew best what the situation was and stated that he would inform his government accordingly, namely that there was no intentional or artificial delay. He then stated that the Soviet Union was of the opinion that a peace conference should be called in the nearest future and that it would be best if a date for such a conference could be agreed during the present exchange of views.

The Secretary said he wanted to go back to Mr. Gromyko's earlier description in his opening remarks of the subject of his talks, and the interpreter read his notes on this point, indicating that Mr. Gromyko had said he was authorized "to discuss the question of a peace treaty with Germany and of settling the problem of West Berlin on the basis of such a treaty." The Secretary said this was a very narrow basis for a discussion. He asked whether we were in a long "Palais Rose" argument about an agenda; or were we talking about Germany and Berlin?

Mr. Gromyko fussed his reply to this question. He said that the question of a peace treaty relates to a treaty with both Germanies. Thus, the whole German problem is involved.

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As to West Berlin, it is only a part of this broader problem.

The Secretary commented that he supposed he could take it that Mr. Gromyko was not excluding the broader approach, other than the proposals advanced by the Soviet Union.

Without replying to the Secretary's last comment, Mr. Gromyko said that he now wanted to express his views on some other problems not related to the question of disarmament and China. He thought that the principles agreed yesterday between the USSR and the US had produced a favorable impression on the Soviet Government and the Soviet people, as well as throughout the world.

The Secretary agreed that was right.

Mr. Gromyko resumed, saying that if there were a real desire to promote disarmament then the Soviet Government was of the opinion that progress could be made in the disarmament field, in bringing about a disarmament agreement, and in implementing such measures as would rid mankind of the burden of arms and lead to a radical improvement also in Soviet-American relations. It would be of great significance in promoting general and complete disarmament if the US and the USSR would agree on bringing the Chinese People's Republic into the talks.

American statesmen, including the Secretary himself, had said that disarmament would be impossible without the participation of China. This was true, but it was not possible to elaborate a disarmament treaty and then simply submit it to the Chinese Government for signature when they had not been party to the negotiations. The United States had been negotiating with the Chinese People's Republic at the ambassadorial level in Geneva and then Warsaw for many

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years, had participated in 1954 with the Chinese in the Indo-China conference, and was now negotiating at the same table on Laos. Consequently, what reason could there be for the United States not to negotiate with the Chinese People's Republic on the all-important question of disarmament? Turning to Red China's membership in the UN, Mr. Gromyko said that the Soviet Government considered the United States position on the admission of the Chinese People's Republic to the UN to be unjustified. That position would find no support. Solution of this question would be important to the UN, to Soviet-American relations, and of course also to relations between the United States and the Chinese People's Republic. In any event, this was not a third-rate problem.

Mr. Gromyko said he wanted to raise this question in these talks. Perhaps he and Mr. Rusk could reach some informal understanding which could later be formalized.

The Secretary replied that he would have to take this matter under advisement. There were some practical problems. Certainly the United States recognized that effective disarmament, at least in the long run, would require the participation of Peiping. In this connection, he cited the US position in the nuclear test proposals providing for release from obligations if other governments, such as the Chinese Communists, did not tie in. However, there were some differences between this problem and the question of UN membership. Moreover, our experience in trying to negotiate with the Chinese Communists had not been encouraging. He commented that the Russians might also have found life with Peiping to be difficult.

Mr. Grromyko denied that the Soviet Union had difficulties with the CPR.

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The meeting concluded with a discussion of what should be said to the press. It was agreed that as little as possible should be said, simply the statement that there had been an exchange of views on a number of problems of mutual interest to the two governments, and that there would be a further meeting sometime next week, the exact date and place still to be set (Mr. Gromyko indicated that he would wish to invite the Secretary and others present to luncheon at the Soviet Delegation's headquarters, tentatively next Wednesday, September 27).

The meeting ended at 5:25 p.m.

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